A network security expert has asserted that some Chinese telecommunications vendors depend on Western technology to produce 5G equipment.
James Lewis, Senior Network Security Researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, made this observation in a recent report about 5G and the potential risks associated with Chinese suppliers.
Lewis argued that firms such as Huawei and ZTE “can’t make products without U.S. technology.” He added that the dependence is not symmetrical: Western manufacturers can build 5G equipment without Chinese components, but doing so would likely be far more expensive.
Earlier this year, ZTE was banned from the US market after violating sanctions that prohibit sales to North Korea and Iran. That ban forced ZTE to suspend much of its activity, lending support to Lewis’s contention that some Chinese vendors are reliant on Western components and technologies.
ZTE stated in a filing in May:
“As a result of the Denial Order, the major operating activities of the company have ceased.”
The company added that it maintained sufficient cash and continued to meet its commercial obligations in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
After negotiating a settlement that included a $1.4 billion fine and changes to its board, ZTE had the US ban lifted. ZTE estimated that the suspension of its operations cost the company roughly $3 billion.
Industry observers point out that only a small number of companies—primarily in the United States—have the capability to manufacture certain high-end components critical to 5G networks, including data converter chips, Ethernet switch chips, and field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Additionally, firms in the US and Europe lead in producing small cell antenna arrays and power amplifiers.
This concentration of advanced semiconductor and radio-frequency expertise in Western suppliers has become a significant strategic factor in the broader trade and technology tensions between the US and China. Access to these components can influence supply chains, product timelines, and negotiating leverage in international disputes.
As governments and network operators evaluate supply-chain risk, considerations include component sourcing, the diversity of suppliers, compliance with export controls, and the cost implications of switching vendors. For some operators, replacing suppliers tied to a particular country could increase costs and complicate deployment schedules, while for others the priority is reducing geopolitical and security exposure.
Ultimately, the dynamics highlighted by Lewis underscore how vital components and specialized manufacturing capabilities remain concentrated in a limited number of firms and regions. That reality affects not only competition between vendors but also national security discussions and policy decisions about the future shape of global 5G deployments.